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It is well known that within Canada the balance of federal and provincial 
authority has gone through a series of pendulum-like phases. We have had 
periods of tremendous federal power: the early years after 1867, the two world 
wars and the post-1945 years. There have also been periods, the 1880s and 1970s 
are examples, of unusual provincial vitality and stridency. Traditionally, most 
constitutional authorities have bemoaned decentralization, provincial rights 
agitations and the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
weakening central authority, while historians like Donald Creighton and W.L. 
Morton (in his later phase) have written persuasively about the collapse of the 
"Macdonaldian" constitution and the ensuing potential for national disintegra-
tion. But the tone of much of our scholarship changed during the 1960s. Older 
traditions persisted, but decentralization and regionalism came very much into 
vogue.1 Historians and social scientists, in an impressive display of herd 
scholarship, went to the regions, the roots, the minorities; this was the way to 
explain what was distinctive about Canada or, on the other hand, what was 
wrong with Canada. There seemed to be an inevitability about it all. The old 
scholarship of Innis, Mackintosh and Creighton did not work any more. The 
tradition of Goldwin Smith and Underhill could not be espoused because it was 
too pro-American. Pro-Canadian nationalism was as unworkable and 
unacceptable as continentalism. There really was no Canada; there were only 
provinces, regions, limited identities. As J.M.S. Careless recently put it, 
"Altogether, limited identities threaten to take over, and settle the matter of a 
Canadian national identity, by ending it outright, leaving perhaps a loose league 
of survivor states essentially existing on American outdoor relief'.2 
Our real complication, of course, was the fact that the second most important 
province, and our most cohesive and distinctive culture, was gripped by nation-
alistic fervor. Scholars in Quebec universities tended to be French Canadian 
nationalists or sympathizers. Numerous academics in other parts of Canada fell 
all over each other in attempts to justify French Canadian nationalism and 
self-determination. For many academics, both in Quebec and elsewhere, the 
scenario was clear. Jean Lesage cleansed Quebec of the spirit of Maurice 
Duplessis and modernized the province, which was moving inevitably towards 
independence. The movement paused under Daniel Johnson and Robert 
Bourassa, but was put back on track by René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois. 
The main line of history was resumed in 1976 when the P.Q. won a smashing 
electoral victory. Many Canadians of goodwill convinced themselves that the 
breakup of Canada would soon be negotiated. In the process, of course, 
1 J.M.S. Careless, " 'Limited Identities ' in Canada", Canadian Historical Review, L (1969), pp. 
1-10, and Northrop Frye's preface to The Bush Garden: Essays on the Canadian Imagination 
(Toronto, 1971) best typify this scholarship. 
2 J.M.S. Careless, "Limited Identities — ten years later", Manitoba History, I, no. 1 (1980), p. 3. 
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Anglophone sins of racism and colonization would be expiated; we would all be 
the better for it. Then came the Quebec referendum on 20 May 1980. A deliber-
ately fuzzy question and a demagogic campaign on the part of Prime Minister 
Lévesque failed to produce the last leg of inevitability. Sovereignty-Association, 
the code phrase for independence, was not only defeated but crushed. What did 
it mean? Was it possible that Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and not René Lévesque, the 
press corps and liberal intellectuals in the universities, represented the main line 
of historical evolution? Well, not likely. The most common interpretation of the 
referendum result assured the inevitable: a "yes" vote would give Lévesque a 
mandate to negotiate the breakup of Canada; a "no" vote would give Trudeau 
and English Canada one final chance to appease the Parti Québécois through 
massive decentralization and constitutional rewriting. This line was given a 
somewhat apologetic cover. After all, Quebec's Anglophones had block voted, 
the federal government had flooded Quebec with slick advertising, and the 
federal forces had ignored portions of Lévesque's referendum legislation. 
The hard evidence, however, seems to be on the other side. Trudeau's basic 
constitutional views have never been obscure; yet he won massive majorities in 
Quebec in the 1979 and 1980 federal elections. In 1980 he also won impressive 
victories in Ontario and the Maritimes. The referendum result gave Trudeau 
exactly what he wanted: the rejection of the P.Q. constitutional position by both 
Anglophone and Francophone Quebecers. The "last chance" argument retains 
popularity, but does not seem to be motivating the Prime Minister, who 
apparently regards the referendum result as a re-affirmation of the federalist 
dualism that began with the Hincks-LaFontaine negotiations in 1839. In a 
bizarre twist of fate, the referendum result has legitimized confederation and 
provided Trudeau with an opportunity for a bold stroke that will strengthen the 
centre and not reduce Canada to a "community of communities". 
In short, there might be much more to Canada than many of our writers and 
commentators during the 1960s and 1970s would allow. This is not to suggest 
that regionalism is unimportant. It is important, but so is regionalism in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The success of the Thatcher Con-
servatives involved a profound electoral cleavage between the region south of the 
Thames and other portions of the country; Jimmy Carter's election in 1976 also 
saw deep regional differentiation, in this case between east and west. Everybody 
is familiar with regional cultures like those of New England, the deep south, 
Wales and the western highlands. These are fascinating regions that merit and 
receive study; so do our regions. But can Britain and the United States, or 
Canada, be explained by regionalism? Have we not allowed the pendulum to 
swing too far? Does not the referendum tell us that Canada is more than the 
sum of its regions? Should not some searching questions be asked about much of 
the recent literature that seeks to interpret and explain Canada? 
Canadian Confederation: A Decision-Making Analysis (Toronto, 
Macmillan of Canada, 1979) by W.L. White, R.H. Wagenberg, R.C. Nelson 
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and W.C. Soderlund is a small but ambitious study. Its four authors, all 
political scientists, seek to explain how our federation works by analysing its 
origins. Such a study is justified, they contend, by a lack of relevant literature. 
"Much of this work is excellent", report the authors, "but little scholarly work 
has been done in the way of a close analysis of the political attitudes which this 
[i.e. the founding] elite as a whole held towards Confederation and federalism" 
(p. 4). So much, one assumes, for the work of Trotter, Whitelaw, Martin, 
Creighton, Waite, Careless, Morton, Hodgins and Bonenfant who, along with 
many other historians, have analysed the confederation movement. This is not 
to suggest that confederation has been definitively studied. New research will no 
doubt produce new insights and interpretations. Unfortunately, White, Wagen-
berg, Nelson and Soderlund were not able to deliver either fresh insight or 
convincing interpretative innovation. 
Their problem is a combination of assumption and methodology. "The focus 
of this work", they explain, "is an empirical study of Confederation, that is, of 
the decision by a political elite in the mid-1860s to adopt a federal system of 
government . . . . The event in the decision-making process on which we have 
focused our attention is the debates in the Canadian Parliament on the Quebec 
Resolutions which occurred during February and March of 1865, and which led 
directly to the dispatch of a committee to London to negotiate the document of 
Confederation" (p. 8). The research technique employed is a content analysis of 
the published debates. Elaborate claims are made for this methodology: "a 
carefully constructed and controlled analysis of the content of the Debates will 
enable us to reconstruct the psychological environment, that is, the way in which 
this extremely important political elite actually perceived the stimuli which were 
necessitating a change of constitutional arrangement. Moreover, we believe that 
from this examination of the elite images of Confederation, we will be able to 
establish with greater insight, the origin of a number of crucial problems of 
Canadian federalism" (p. 16). Subjects within speeches are identified, measured 
and the results toted up in both tabular and prose format. 
The authors' methodology and assumptions doom the study. First, the site is 
wrong. The key decision-making unit was almost certainly the Quebec 
Conference, or possibly the Charlottetown, Quebec and London conferences 
combined, and not the Parliament of Canada. Second, the personnel studied is 
not the real political elite of either Canada or confederation. The conferences 
included Canadians and Maritimers, and were conducted within a framework 
that ultimately involved important British officials. Maritimers are excluded for 
reasons that are difficult to take seriously: "Arguments stressing the importance 
of the Province of Canada in the decision-making process leading to 
Confederation are many. For example, P.B. Waite believes that Confederation 
was pushed jointly by Canada and the British Colonial office, and that the 
Maritime Provinces were dragged in kicking and screaming" (p. 139, n. 2). 
Waite's view, of course, is distorted. New Brunswick did endorse Confederation 
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in the election of 1866. Charles Tupper and Samuel Leonard Tilley were not 
"dragged in kicking and screaming"; they were important fathers of confedera-
tion, and any definition of the confederation elite, in this case "the Parliament of 
Canada" (p. 9), that includes non-entities like Hope Mackenzie and James 
O'Halloran and anti-confederates like J.B.E. Dorion and J.F. Perrault, but 
ignores major figures like Tupper and Tilley is absurd. Third, the authors seem 
oblivious to the real implications of party discipline. The confederation debate 
was controlled by the great coalition that employed all of its very considerable 
authority to secure approval of the Quebec resolutions and to keep its members 
in line. Fourth, the authors are convinced that MPPs in 1865 said what they 
really believed: "We have rejected as unfounded any assertions that the 
Confederation debates are an unreliable guide to the motives underlying the 
decision actually taken. We find no evidence to impeach the sincerity of the 
speakers nor to assume any divergence between public utterance and subjective 
conviction" (p. 109). No divergence? 
Late in 1864 John A. Macdonald wrote to a fellow Tory: "If the Confedera-
tion goes on you, if spared the ordinary age of man, will see both local parlia-
ments and governments absorbed in the general power. This is as plain to me as 
if I saw it accomplished".3 At the close of the Quebec Conference an exuberant 
George Brown exulted to his wife: "Is it not wonderful? French Canadianism 
entirely extinguished!" At the end of this most revealing letter he indicated that 
the new constitution would be no impediment to the ambitions of Ontario: "You 
will say our constitution is dreadfully Tory — and so it is — but we have the 
power in our hands (if it passes), to change it as we like. Hurrah!"4 With diver-
gences like these floating about in the published literature, how can serious 
scholars argue that "it is our contention that verbal articulation aimed at 
clarifying one's position on such an important issue is indeed a reasonable 
indicator of one's actual position" (p. 12). 
It is hardly surprising that the application of a dubious methodology to the 
wrong group has produced some curious results. For example, the authors 
contend that "country of birth" is as an important factor "which hitherto has 
gone unnoticed" and "that there were two major groups supporting Confedera-
tion, Lower Canadian Conservatives and both Reformers and Conservatives 
representing Lower and Upper Canada who had immigrated from the British 
Isles" (p. 107). If, however, we look at a different group we get a different 
answer. One could argue that the real confederation elite in British North 
America consisted of seventeen men: Tupper, Archibald, Tilley, Mitchell, 
Wilmot, Cartier, Langevin, McGee, Gait, Chapais, Taché, Macdonald, 
Campbell, Brown, Mowat, McDougall and Howland. This group made the key 
3 Cited in Donald Creighton, The Road to Confederation: The Emergence of Canada: 1863-1867 
(Toronto, 1964), p. 165. 
4 Cited in J.M.S. Careless, Brown of the Globe, vol. II (Toronto, 1963), p. 171. 
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decisions: eleven were born in British North America; Campbell and Howland 
arrived at age one; Macdonald came when he was five. Only McGee, Brown and 
Gait emigrated as adults. In short, the group of British North Americans who 
made the real confederation decisions was overwhelmingly native born and 
included only three men who emigrated as adults. This pattern is true even of 
Ontario. Six of the above groups were Ontarians; only Brown came to Canada 
as an adult. 
Canadian Confederation: A Decision Making Analysis is a disturbing book. 
It injects the red herring of a native versus immigrant struggle into confedera-
tion historiography. It grossly distorts the confederation movement by dismiss-
ing the Maritime leadership, which was crucial to both the confederation and 
anti-confederation movements. The argument that the Maritimes were 
"dragged in kicking and screaming" is an oversimplification that ignores a 
generation of scholarship and will, no doubt, feed certain regional sentiments of 
a paranoid sort. Was the real problem the fact that the Maritimers did not 
publish their debates, and therefore left nothing that social scientists can 
calibrate? Is this study really just a methodology in search of a framework? 
Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity (Toronto, 
Macmillan of Canada, 1979) by Garth Stevenson, The Roots of Disunity: A 
Look at Canadian Political Culture (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1979) 
by David Bell and Lome Tepperman, and Fragile Federation: Social Change in 
Canada (Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1979) by Lorna R. Marsden 
and Edward B. Harvey are broad surveys that were written for three different 
series. Unfulfilled Union is the most successful of the three. Stevenson discusses 
federalism and the creation of confederation. He surveys the history of 
Canadian federalism and concludes with a set of chapters that analyse govern-
ment finance, intergovernmental conflict, constitutional reform and our federal 
prospects. Stevenson is a dedicated centralizer: "the balance of articulate 
opinion has in the last decade shifted excessively in a direction that I can only 
regard as disastrous" (p. ix). The problem, it would seem, is that Canadian 
federalism, with its strong provinces, places too much stress on elite accom-
modation: "the concept of consociationalism has itself become a rather sophis-
ticated ideological tool to justify the continuing elitism of Canadian politics. 
Elitism in political decision-making is closely associated with the maintenance 
of cultural and provincial barriers, real or imaginary, among the people of 
Canada, so that each serves to reinforce the other. By celebrating both, or at 
least failing to question them, the theorists of 'consociational democracy are 
playing an ideological role. The consociational concept is the compact theory in 
a new guise" (p. 48). Canadian governments, in fact, constitute little more than 
slightly disguised covers for special interests: "It appears that governments have 
in practice selected the 'responsibilities' they wanted whenever those private 
groups and interests with a direct stake in the outcome of the activity concerned 
found it convenient for them to do so, and have then scrambled for the revenues 
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needed to carry out the task" (p. 150). 
The Roots of Disunity also sees regionalism, or at least provincialism, as an 
impediment to creative politics. Disunity prevents effective protest: "Hence such 
subordinated people as women, the young, the old, native people, and racial 
minorities are kept from protesting their unfair treatment as strongly as they 
might if the nation were united. By using regional conflict to promote regional 
loyalties, the elites can sometimes 'divide and conquer' the opposition pushing 
up from below" (p. 183). From this naive and vaguely paranoid perspective, we 
need national unity in order to attain the politics of idealism, the details of which 
are left unexplained: "Politics, as the working out of visions of a better world, 
have almost disappeared from the national scene in Canada. We find instead 
politics as administration and a mere balancing of selfish interests. National 
unity cannot be created out of such flimsy stuff. The political culture must be 
revitalized; worthwhile collective goals identified; and Canadians must be 
inspired to overcome the growing balkanization and distrust. Our heritage, 
rooted in disunity, may hinder as much as help us in making the new start" (p. 
250). Presumably, if we achieve the unity advocated by Bell and Tepperman we 
will be within striking distance of the vision and creativity of the politics of the 
United States. 
Fragile Federation also takes regionalism very seriously: "we are saying that 
regional and cultural interests and loyalties fracture class consciousness in this 
country, and therefore modify the potential for change" (p. 131). Marsden and 
Harvey argue that there "is not a single national culture expressing the whole of 
Canada, which is a feature that is characteristic of a semi-peripheral society" 
(p. 152). What all of this means is somewhat puzzling to this historian. Presum-
ably the point yet again is that we need more unity and less regionalism in order 
to have the creative politics of real class warfare. 
The works of Stevenson, Bell and Tepperman, and Marsden and Harvey pose 
some very serious problems. Each book is a broad overview that includes 
considerable quantities of Canadian history combined with a survey of contem-
porary Canada. Each work advances a varient of the "divide and rule" 
interpretation of regionalism and/or federalism, and argues, with greater and 
lesser degrees of explicitness, for a form of radical politics that is unlikely to 
emerge until we have much more national unity. There is agreement on the point 
that our politics is now class based; the problem is that the wrong class is in the 
saddle. With sufficient unity the oppressed groups, "women, the young, the old, 
native people, and racial minorities" in The Roots of Disunity, will be able to 
organize to obtain a greater degree of justice. 
Two very broad questions should be asked. The first concerns politics. Is this 
kind of political programme desirable? The answer, of course, relates to each 
individual's political philosophy. A supplementary question is perhaps more 
germane. Will more unity lead to more radicalism? The answer is probably 
"no". We know that the elites are far from homogenous. Industrialists in 
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Toronto have precious little community of interest with oilmen in Calgary; 
similarly, unionized industrial workers in Toronto have interests at substantial 
variance with the Alberta workforce. This point becomes evident when one 
observes the very broad policy differences that exist in the N.D.P. in areas like 
nuclear energy and oil pricing. The second question concerns scholarship. What 
is the relationship between the policy orientation of these books and the 
scholarship involved? Does the policy, implicit and explicit, emerge from the 
research? It certainly does not emerge from the historical scholarship which 
tends to be slipshod. The points that follow are not intended to be picky, but to 
illustrate the fact that in each book the historical portion of the evidentiary base 
is highly suspect. 
Stevenson suggests that "the Liberal party, while remaining true to George 
Brown's ideals, was able to incorporate (and incidentally make harmless) the 
remnants of anti-Confederation sentiment in all of the provinces" (pp. 66-7). 
John A. Macdonald's Conservative party absorbed Joseph Howe, the most 
important single anti-confederate, and many of his followers. In Ontario, the 
most prominent anti-confederate was John Sandfield Macdonald. In 1867 he 
entered a close alliance with John A. and the federal Tories. The longest 
anti-confederation speech in the confederation debate in Canada was delivered 
by Christopher Dunkin. He remained a Conservative. The Rouges group was 
anti-confederation on a partisan basis, and retained its alliance with the 
Liberals. A.J. Smith, the anti-confederate leader in New Brunswick, remained a 
Liberal. The post-confederation careers of anti-confederates did not follow any 
consistent pattern. 
Stevenson states that in "1891 the federal Liberals were persuaded by Mowat 
to adopt a policy of unrestricted free trade with the United States" (p. 85). This 
is related to Mowat's opposition to the National Policy and the wants of 
Ontario's lumbermen. Such an argument grossly simplifies the politics of the 
1891 campaign. Federal Liberals like Sir Richard Cartwright agitated for a 
policy of Commercial Union with the Americans, and in the process attracted 
the support of annexationists. Unrestricted reciprocity was a watered down 
economic policy that was forced on the Liberal party by moderates like J.D. 
Edgar. P.B. Waite refers to "the party's apparently unrepentant commitment to 
unrestricted reciprocity", and notes that it "made Oliver Mowat uneasy".5 On 
basic economic policy, Mowat was a moderate who was closer to Macdonald 
than to the federal leaders of his own party. Again, Stevenson states, "There is 
no evidence that the provincial jurisdiction over education was intended to have 
anything to do with universities" (p. 150). Nineteenth-century politicians were 
not as passionately concerned about universities as are twentieth-century profes-
sors. John A. Macdonald, however, wrote much of the B.N.A. Act and had 
extremely close ties with Queen's University, whose interests he routinely 
5 Peter B. Waite, Canada 1874-1896: Arduous Destiny (Toronto, 1971), p. 224. 
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defended. When the details of the confederation scheme were made public it was 
evident to those concerned that universities would indeed fall under provincial 
jurisdiction and that public grants to sectarian colleges in Ontario, chiefly 
Queen's and Victoria, would be threatened. An intense campaign was launched 
to save the provincial grants; the campaign failed and in 1868 the province 
announced the termination of grants to sectarian colleges. In the midst of this 
controversy, John A. Macdonald commiserated with Principal Snodgrass of 
Queen's. He noted that Premier John Sandfield Macdonald's "only claim to 
public support is his reputation for economy, and to keep that up he sacrifices 
every principal of justice". Sandfield's political credit was "almost worn to 
rags".6 Macdonald made no suggestion whatever that universities should be 
under federal jurisdiction. He expressed no interest in incurring any such juris-
diction or responsibility. Macdonald believed in a highly centralized federation, 
and initially regarded the provinces as glorified municipalities. It is hardly to be 
credited that he said and did nothing about an early violation of federal 
jurisdiction. 
Bell and Tepperman approached the basics of Canadian history with an 
attitude so cavalier as to be breathtaking. Hence the rebellions of 1837 occurred 
"over the issue of responsible government" (p. 68, n. 42). One wonders where 
such a notion can be found in any respectable scholarship produced during the 
past twenty years. During the period of the union, we learn that "the capital 
moved back and forth, periodically, between Kingston and Quebec City". This, 
of course, was never the case. Further to enrich our understanding of the hapless 
Union, Bell and Tepperman inform us that "Legislation that interested only 
one-half of the united Canadas was placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
members from that hal f (p. 117). This mangled version of history, which 
ignores aspects of the union as fundamental as the Taché Act and the Scott Act, 
is then used to explain how the Union worked: "These and other similar 
measures allowed the English and French to live together on 'the landing of 
politics' without either pushing the other over" (p. 117). Jack Horner was 
appointed to the cabinet in 1977 and became the "first Albertan in forty years to 
hold a major federal portfolio" (p. 187). Inexplicably, Douglas Harkness, who 
played a key role in the destruction of the Diefenbaker regime and held the 
Agriculture and Defence portfolios, is dismissed as having "held two moderately 
important cabinet posts" (p. 205, n. 30). It is true that Alberta has been a 
maverick province, but surely ministers like Harry Hays and Bud Olson, who 
held the Agriculture portfolio in the Pearson and first Trudeau governments 
respectively, cannot be dismissed as unimportant. 
Marsden and Harvey also treat us to a strange version of our past. Hence, the 
"timber trade led to important economic development . . . and the creation of 
6 Cited in Bruce W. Hodgins, John Sandfield Macdonald. 1812-1872 (Toronto, 1971), p. 96. See 
also Hilda Neatby, Queen's University, vol. I (Montreal, 1978), p. 113. 
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centres which ultimately evolved into the major cities of today" (p. 53). This 
might be true of Ottawa, but what of Toronto, Hamilton, Calgary, Winnipeg 
and Vancouver? Or again (using the work of J.A. Banks), "the nationalist 
movement in French Canada arose from the rapid industrialization of Quebec 
after World War II" (p. 171). Surely any generalization about French Canadian 
nationalism should not exclude figures like Garneau, Papineau, Dorion, 
Mercier, Bourassa and Groulx. Constitutional history is out of fashion these 
days. Even so, should scholars suggest that "in 1929 the British Privy Council 
amended the British North America Act" (p. 194)? 
Marsden and Harvey quote S.D. Clark's well known comment: "What the 
historian presumably is interested in are the facts of history; what the sociologist 
is interested in is the way these facts are related in some sociologically signifi-
cant pattern" (p. 6). The historian grubs about; the social scientist is trained to 
take this raw data and find the significant patterns. The three volumes reviewed 
in this section seem to reveal something else. Were the patterns there before the 
commencement of research? Do we have here much more than a series of politi-
cal credos that are dressed up with footnotes and survey material? 
John Crispo's Mandate for Canada (Don Mills, General Publishing Co., 
1979) and the Fraser Institute's Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads: 
The Search for a Federal-Provincial Balance (Vancouver, The Fraser Institute, 
1978) are, at least, not at all disguised: they are manifestos that make very 
specific recommendations. 
Some of Crispo's suggestions are simplistic. He advocates, for example, a 
salary of $100,000 per annum for M.P.s, and believes that this will bring better 
qualified people into public life. He also wants a form of proportional 
representation for the House of Commons, and better leaves of absence 
arrangements so that high quality professionals can enter politics without doing 
serious damage to their careers. Such reforms might be helpful, but it is doubtful 
that Canada's political problems relate all that significantly to the talent pool 
for politicians. 
Crispo describes various assaults on the federal authority and summarizes 
succinctly "the costs of [further] decentralization" (pp. 65-6), which will be very 
heavy. Nonetheless, he endorses the notion that Quebec, and Quebec alone, 
should decide the future of Canada: "I believe Québec would be foolish to go its 
own way, but I believe even more strongly that it must have the right to make 
such a tragic mistake. I take this position even though I am certain that it would 
eventually prove fatal to the survival of both English Canada and Québec" (p. 
64). Crispo's position on self-determination for Quebec and decentralization in 
general brings to mind the query of Aldous Huxley, "We know that the pursuit 
of good ends does not justify the employment of bad means. But what about 
those situations . . . in which good means have end results which turn out to be bad?"7 
7 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited (New York, 1960), the latter 
work, p. 20. 
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While further decentralization will be enormously costly, Canada "will 
probably have to become even more decentralized if it is to survive " (p. 67). 
Mandate for Canada is a thin little tract that has about it the tone of the 
professor-on-the-street. 
Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads, multi-authored by a group that 
is dominated by economists, is in a different class altogether. It is a full-scale, 
sustained assault on federal power that constitutes the reductio ad absurdum of 
regionalism and decentralization. The objectives are set out in the preface: "This 
Fraser Institute study arose from the judgement that much of what is interpreted 
as separatist sentiment in Quebec, and in the West and in the Maritimes, could 
well, in fact, represent a deeply rooted reaction to a rising feeling of alienation 
from government . . . . The central thrust of the book is an assessment of 
whether decentralization of government might improve our ability to retain our 
dedication to a unified destiny" (p. xiii). Nine humourless chapters provide a 
loud affirmative response: decentralization will save Canada. 
The budget must be balanced, and this principal must be "enshrined in the 
constitution" (p. xviii). Why? "To better ensure the financial independence of 
the provinces and to place confederation on a firmer financial footing" (p. xviii). 
Most transfer payments from the federal to provincial governments should be 
abolished, since transfer payments, like welfare, sap initiative and self-respect 
and consequently are not in the best interests of the recipient regions. Provinces 
should have greater access to tax revenues, and federal spending should be 
curtailed. Since the C.B.C. is "not pursuing the goals that it was originally 
established to pursue" (p. 254) and is not accountable, "we see no merit in 
having a federally financed public broadcasting corporation" (p. 258). Ottawa 
should virtually withdraw from the language policy field. Manpower training 
programmes should be handed over to the provinces, which should also acquire 
more responsibility for law enforcement. The federal authorities should 
abandon all involvement with education. Even fiscal policy should fall under the 
axe of the decentralizers: "The idea of a truly independent provincial fiscal 
policy is naturally very speculative.... The power to conduct independent fiscal 
policy will not eradicate the conflict, but it would reduce one element in the 
ongoing federal-provincial debate. If it can be done without too high a cost, it 
would be worthwhile for the future of confederation" (p. 282). 
Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads is not totally anti-federal. A 
common market is to be retained, and it is conceded that immigration policy 
must remain in federal hands. Presumably the federal government should 
continue to run the army, appoint ambassadors and administer federal 
territories. But the programme of the Fraser Institute would leave us with a 
truncated and ineffective federal administration. And why should we implement 
these proposals? We should do it so that we can accommodate the "separatist 
sentiment" in Quebec, the Maritimes and the West. A right-wing fantasy should 
be accepted because of a non-existent movement in the Maritimes, a lunatic-
Acadiensis 153 
fringe movement on the Prairies and a movement in Quebec that has been over-
whelmingly rejected. 
Regionalism — or perhaps more broadly, limited identities — was probably 
the most important concept employed by Canadian historians during the 1970s. 
It also saturates the writings of many of our social scientists. But while scholars 
used the concept extensively in their scholarship, they have employed little 
terminological precision.8 The books reviewed in this article provide ample 
justification for a plea for more precise definitions. Although all have much to 
say or imply about regionalism/provincialism/limited identities, in no case is' 
the result satisfying. 
Let us by all means study regions and a vast array of other limited themes, but 
surely it is time to give precision to the definitions of the concepts that we use. 
Let us also bear in mind the implications of 20 May 1980. There is much more 
to Canada than limited identities. The people of Quebec have made abundantly 
clear that Canada is not about to be reduced to Professor Careless' "loose 
league of survivor states essentially existing on American outdoor relief. The 
people of Quebec sent a message to the politicians; perhaps it should also be 
received by our historians and social scientists. 
DONALD SWAINSON 
8 This might now be changing. J.M.S. Careless, in his "Limited Identities — ten years later", 
works towards a definition: regionalism is only one of an untold number of limited identities. 
However, one derives the impression that Professor Careless would subsume everything to the 
topic except possibly the tariffand the central bank. It might be that a belief in limited identities is 
really an act of faith, a conviction that Canada does not exist. In an even more recent article, 
"Approaching Regions and Regionalism in Canadian History" in The History and Social 
Science Teacher, 15 (Summer 1980), William Westfall pushes the pendulum in the other direction. 
He finds political, economic and cultural regions, and argues that within the framework of region-
alism one can and should study poverty, ethnicity and numerous other themes. Westfall argues 
that "a region must be part of something". He analyses those features that make the prairies 
distinctive, and argues that each such feature "demonstrates not the weakness but the power of the 
national government to shape the character of regions. Here is an example of a 'national' policy 
creating a system of regional imbalance" (p. 257). Professor Westfall thus restores the nation to 
the centre of analysis. That is what the referendum of 20 May did for Canadian politics. 
